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Background
Following the presentation of the draft Constitutional Treaty by the 
convention chaired by Giscard d’Estaing, in September 2003 the 
United Kingdom government published a White Paper2 on the 
British Approach to the Intergovernmental Conference. The overall 
approach of the UK government to the draft Treaty was clearly 
summarised by the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, when he 
introduced the White Paper to the House of Commons on 9 
September 2003. He there stated that “the proposals in the current 
draft Treaty do not change the fundamental relationship between 
the EU and its Member States; and on any analysis it involves less 
change than that in Maastricht and the Single European Act”. With 
the benefit of hindsight, it is interesting to observe that on that 
basis he suggested that there was no need for a referendum, and 
that the outcome of the IGC should be decided upon by Parliament. 
Whatever the vagaries of domestic politics which have led to the 
2004 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe which resulted 
from the Intergovernmental Conference being subject to a 
referendum in the UK, that Treaty does in fact effect a number of 
1  This is a revised version of a paper presented in Malta on 7 April 
2005 under the title “Institutional Aspects Of The Constitutional 
Treaty – A Small State Perspective.”
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institutional changes which taken together may be regarded as of 
some importance. 
Under the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties institutional reform was 
very much driven by the prospect of enlargement, and arguably 
inappropriate linkages were made between e.g. voting rights in the 
Council of Ministers and the number of members of the 
Commission. However, one of the most noticeable features of the 
Constitutional Treaty is that it alters the delicate balance achieved 
at Nice in relation to the direct and indirect representation of 
Member States and their citizens in the EU institutions. Opposition 
to this by Spain and Poland delayed adoption of the Constitutional 
Treaty by Member States, but it may be suggested that in some 
ways the Constitutional Treaty will strengthen the position of the 
smaller Member States, and also increase the role of national 
parliaments. This paper will examine the direct representation of 
Member States in the European Council and the Council of 
Ministers, what might be termed their indirect representation in 
the Commission (and, by way of contrast, the European Central 
Bank), and the direct representation of their citizens in the 
European Parliament and through national parliaments.
Direct Representation of Member States
• European Council and Council of Ministers
2
No commentary on the Constitutional Treaty can avoid noting that 
it would provide for the European Council to have a President 
elected by his or her colleagues for a term of two-and-a-half years 
renewable once (art.I-22), and that the European Council would 
include the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs (art.I-21(2)), who would 
also be a vice-President of the Commission (art.I-26(5)).  Its 
decisions in principle are to be taken by consensus (art.I-21(4)), so 
that in principle the views of Malta or Luxembourg count for as 
much as those of Germany,  but a number of articles of the Treaty 
provide specifically for the European Council to act by qualified 
majority, and the same rules for qualified majorities apply as in the 
Council of Ministers (art.I-25(3)), and it is in the context of the 
Council of Ministers that some subtle changes have been made.
Under art.I-23(3) the Council continues to comprise a 
representative of each Member State at ministerial level.  The 
Constitutional Treaty would at last give express recognition to the 
different  “formations” of the Council. The Treaty text envisages:
o General Affairs Council (art. I-24(2))
o Foreign Affairs Council chaired by EU Minister for 
Foreign Affairs (art.I-28(3))
o Other configurations determined by the European 
Council (art.I-24(4))
Except for the foreign Affairs Council, the Presidency of these 
configurations would be held on rotation, as determined by the 
European Council (art.I-24(7)). The draft decision on this annexed 
to the Treaty envisages that the Presidency of the Council, with the 
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exception of the Foreign Affairs configuration, is to be held by pre-
established groups of three Member States for a period of 18 
months. The groups are to be made up on a basis of equal rotation 
among the Member States, “taking into account their diversity and 
geographical balance within the Union.” It is further envisaged that 
each member of the group should in turn chair for a six-month 
period all configurations of the Council, with the exception of the 
Foreign Affairs configuration, and that the other members of the 
group should assist the Chair in all its responsibilities on the basis 
of a common programme, although members of the
team may decide alternative arrangements among themselves. This 
obviously represents a formalisation of the traditional “troika” 
between current, past, and future holders of the Presidency. 
Similarly, it is envisaged that the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States is to be 
chaired by a representative of the Member State chairing the 
General Affairs Council, but that the Political and Security 
Committee should be chaired by a representative of the Union 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, the chair of the 
preparatory bodies of the various Council configurations, with the 
exception of the Foreign Affairs configuration, is to fall to the 
member of the group chairing the relevant configuration, unless 
decided otherwise. It is also made clear in the draft decision that it 
is to be the role of the General Affairs Council to ensure 
consistency and continuity in the work of the different Council 
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configurations in the framework of multiannual programmes in 
cooperation with the Commission. 
However, a fundamental change is made in the decision-making 
process by providing that the Council should normally act by a 
qualified majority (art.I-23(3)).  Historically, 1the basic rule laid 
down by what is currently art.205(1) of the EC Treaty has always 
been that "save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, the Council 
shall act by a majority of its members". There were however 
relatively few provisions in the Treaty which did not provide 
otherwise, thus allowing the Council to act by a simple majority, 
and their number had been reduced further by the Single European 
Act and subsequent Treaties. Critics of the Single European Act 
would in fact count it as a retrograde step that whereas the original 
art.49 of the EEC Treaty, dealing with legislation on the free 
movement for workers, allowed the Council to act by a simple 
majority, albeit without being expressly required to consult the 
European Parliament, the version introduced by art.6(3) of the 
Single European Act required the Council to act by a qualified 
majority, even if it was in co-operation with the European 
Parliament (and further amendment by the Maastricht Treaty 
introduced the codecision procedure to this provision). 
On the other hand, simple majority voting remained possible in the 
area of vocational training under art.128 of the original version of 
5
the EEC Treaty, a provision held to be wide enough to cover the 
second phase of the programme on cooperation between 
universities and industry regarding training in the field of 
technology (COMETT II) in Cases C-51, 90 and 94/89 United 
Kingdom, France and Germany v. Council3, until its replacement by 
the more specific provisions on education introduced by the 
Maastricht Treaty. It may however be observed that the current 
art.149 on education allows the Council to act in codecision with 
the Parliament, as does art.150 on vocational training.
This procedure, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, and simplified 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam, has largely replaced the cooperation 
procedure created by the Single European Act.  These procedures 
have led to a greatly increased use of qualified majority voting, 
since both procedures involve the use of that system in the Council. 
The original version of the EC Treaty did, of course, contain a 
number of provisions allowing for a qualified majority to be used, 
but the opportunity was very rarely taken to make use of it. This, to 
a large extent, is usually attributed to the influence of the so-called 
Luxembourg Accords of 1966. In anticipation of the introduction of 
qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers with regard to 
agricultural legislation under the original art. 43(2) and (3) of the 
EEC Treaty, at the end of the second stage of the original 
transitional period (i.e. 1 January 1966), the French government 
3 [1991] ECR I-2757
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pursued its "empty chair" policy in the second half of 1965, 
refusing to send a Minister to attend Council meetings. The 
Accords, which in reality appeared to be no more than a press 
release recording the terms of the settlement under which France 
agreed to end its "empty chair" policy, record the agreement of the 
Member States that even where decisions could be taken by a 
majority vote, where very important interests of a Member State 
were at stake, the members of the Council would endeavour to 
reach solutions which could be adopted by all the members of the 
Council, and a second paragraph added that the French delegation 
considered that where very important interests were at stake, the 
discussion must be continued until unanimous agreement was 
reached. Whatever may be the precise legal status of this 
agreement to disagree, it was of considerable political importance. 
It gave rise to what was effectively a convention that policy-making 
legislation would only be adopted in the Council when a consensus 
had been achieved; so, for example, it took 17 years to reach 
agreement on a Directive concerning the activities of architects. 
However, on one of the few occasions on which the United Kingdom 
formally invoked the Luxembourg accords, in relation to the 1982 
agricultural prices, a vote was still taken and the United Kingdom 
was out-voted. It may nevertheless be doubted whether all the 
participants intended simply to override the Luxembourg Accords: 
it would appear that France (which voted with the majority) took 
the view that the agricultural prices as such were not "very 
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important interests" for the UK, whose real argument was over 
contributions to the EC budget. 
That the use of unanimity, albeit with abstentions, was really a 
matter of political will, rather than legal obligation, is illustrated by 
the fact that although until 1986 the number of decisions taken by 
the Council on a majority basis barely reached double figures in 
any one year, in 1986, even though the Single European Act was 
not yet in force, during the first half of the year under the Dutch 
Presidency, some 43 items of legislation were adopted on a majority 
basis, and in the second half of the year, under the United Kingdom 
presidency, no less than 55 legislative acts were adopted on a 
majority basis. Subsequently, qualified majority voting has become 
the norm in most areas of Community policy-making (with the 
notable exception of taxation).
1Qualified majorities involve a system of weighted voting, 
approximately related to the size of the Member State. Under the 
system in use before the 2004 Accessions, the four biggest Member 
States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, each had 
10 votes, whereas at the other end of the scale, Luxembourg had 
two votes4. Until the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986, the 
system was designed to ensure that no more than one big Member 
State could be out-voted, but that the big Member States could not 
by themselves out-vote the smaller Member States. However, from 
4  EC Treaty Article 205
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1986 onwards, it became possible for two of the large Member 
States to be out-voted on a qualified majority vote; in other words, 
France and the United Kingdom, for example, could vote against a 
proposal and it could still become Community law. This trend 
continued following the Accession of Sweden, Austria and Finland 
(though it was still not possible for three big states to be outvoted), 
and gave rise to UK resistance, which led to the so-called "Ioannina 
compromise". While in principle following the 1995 accessions a 
qualified majority required 62 of the total of 87 votes distributed 
between the Member States, under that political compromise, "if 
members  of the  Council  representing a total of 23 to 25 votes 
indicate their  intention to oppose the adoption by the Council of a 
decision by qualified majority, the Council will do all within its 
power to reach, within a reasonable time and without prejudicing 
the obligatory time limits laid down by the  Treaties and by 
secondary legislation, such as those in  Articles [251] and [252] of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community, a satisfactory 
solution that can be  adopted by at least 65 votes. During this 
period, and with full regard for  the Rules of Procedure of the 
Council, the President, with the assistance of the Commission, will 
undertake any  initiatives necessary to facilitate a wider basis of 
agreement in the Council.  The members of the Council will lend 
him their assistance."  This appears to be an attempt (albeit limited 
in scope) politically to preserve the rights of what would have been 
a blocking minority before the 1995 Accessions (when a qualified 
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majority was 54 out of 76 votes). Its status would however appear 
to have been enhanced by a Declaration to the Final Act introduced 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam to the effect that "until the entry into 
force of the first enlargement it is agreed that the decision of the 
Council of 29 March 1994 ("the Ioannina Compromise") will be 
reconducted" 
Indeed, the Council Secretariat had calculated that if the previous 
trend in the development of qualified majorities continued 
unaltered, in a Community of 28 (including East European and 
Mediterranean countries) a group of States representing less than 
half of the total population could constitute a qualified majority. 
While the problem was recognised but left unresolved at 
Amsterdam, the solution adopted in the Treaty of Nice and followed 
in the 2003 Act of Accession involves reweighting in favour of 
larger Member States (which for these purposes includes Spain, 
since Spain is a Member State from which two Commissioners used 
to be appointed) and the imposition of a population requirement. At 
present under art.205 of the EC Treaty as amended by the 2003 




























It may be observed that while the Treaty of Nice and the 2003 Act 
of Accession may generally be regarded as reinforcing the position 
of the large Member States, Spain and Poland in particular are 
favoured by this formula, and, for example, a combination of the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia would have more votes than 
a large Member State with less than half the population. However, 
the real change is that under a new art.205(4), the 232 votes must 
be cast by Member States representing at least 62% of the total 
population of the EU. 
Currently any three of the four biggest Member States have a large 
enough population to form a blocking minority on the basis of the 
figures set out in Council Decision 2004/701 amending the 
Council’s Rules of Procedure (OJ 2004 L319/15), so it remains the 
case that two of the biggest Member States may be outvoted, but 
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not three of them. On the figures in the decision, the threshold for 
a qualified majority is 284,331,400 out of  a total population of 
458,599,000, making the blocking minority any figure higher than 
174,267,600.  The aggregate populations of any three of the four 
biggest member States easily surpass this, ranging from 
179,224,400 (France, UK and Italy) to 203,867,900 (Germany, 
France and UK).
 However, it is here that the Constitutional Treaty would make a 
major difference: with effect from 1 November 2009, under the 
Constitutional Treaty art.I-25(1), a qualified majority would require 
the votes of  55% of the members of Council (so that Malta’s vote 
would count as much as Germany’s), comprising at least 15 
members representing 65% of the EU’s population. At first sight 
this population requirement might seem to raise the threshold for a 
qualified majority, but the second sub-paragraph of art.I-25(1) 
would introduce a requirement that a blocking minority must 
include at least 4 Council members; otherwise a qualified majority 
will be deemed to have been obtained. Again, any three of the four 
biggest Member States would have a large enough population to 
form a blocking minority, but they would need a fourth State, even 
Malta or Luxembourg, to vote with them to prevent a qualified 
majority being attained.  It will therefore at last be possible for any 
three of the biggest four Member States to be outvoted. On the 
other hand, where the Council does not act on the basis of a 
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proposal from the Commission or from the Union Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, a qualified majority would, under art.I-25(2), have 
to comprise at least 72% of the members of the Council, though the 
population requirements would remain the same.
A similar pattern would be followed in areas in which not all 
member states participate: in the context of enhanced cooperation 
(art.I-44) and Economic and Monetary Union (art.II-194 etc.), a 
qualified majority would be the votes of 55% of the participant 
Member States, comprising at least 65% of their combined 
population, and a blocking minority would be the minimum number 
representing more than 35% of the population of the participating 
States, plus one member. This represents a change from the 
previous pattern, particularly in the area of Economic and 
Monetary Union: 1while the current qualified majority represents 
about 72% of the weighted votes, in those areas where it was 
anticipated under the Maastricht Treaty that Community activity 
might involve less than all the Members of the Community, notably 
under the Social Protocol5 and eventually under the third stage of 
Economic and Monetary Union6, a qualified majority was reduced 
to two-thirds of the available votes. This model was not followed in 
the Treaty of Amsterdam: in the Title on free movement of persons, 
asylum and immigration, in which the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
5  Art.2
6  EC Treaty art.122(5)
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Denmark do not in principle participate, a qualified majority is 
defined as "the same proportion of the weighted votes of the 
members of the Council concerned as laid down in Article 205(2)", 
and the same formula is used in the provisions on Closer 
Cooperation and Flexibility. However, the Amsterdam Treaty did 
not amend the EMU provisions introduced at Maastricht, nor did 
the Nice Treaty, so that for the 12 participants in EMU a qualified 
majority remains two-thirds of the available votes. The question 
then arises as to whether this would be with or without the 
population requirement, a matter not envisaged in the texts. This 
depends on whether art.122(5) should be construed as a derogation 
from the whole of art.205 or simply as a derogation from the voting 
figures in art.205. From its wording, it may be suggested that 
art.122(5) appears to be a derogation from art.205 as such, so it is 
at least arguable that the current population requirement would 
not apply in this context. The entry into force of the Constitutional 
Treaty would clearly remove this anomaly. 
However, after the entry into force of the new voting rules in 2009, 
and at least until 2014, a modified form of the "Ioannina 
compromise" would continue under the draft decision relating to 
the implementation of art.I-25 of the Constitutional Treaty, which 
provides that if members of the Council, representing at least three 
quarters of the population or  at least three quarters of the number 
of Member States necessary to constitute a blocking minority 
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resulting from the application of Article I-25(1), first subparagraph, 
or Article I-25(2), indicate their opposition to the Council adopting 
an act by a qualified majority, “the Council shall discuss the issue.” 
In the course of these discussions, the Council is do all in its power 
to reach, within a reasonable time and without prejudicing 
obligatory time limits laid down by Union law, a satisfactory 
solution to address concerns raised by the those members, and the 
President of the Council, with the assistance of the Commission, 
would be empowered “to undertake any initiative necessary to 
facilitate a wider basis of agreement in the Council”. 
Finally, it may be observed that art.IV-444 of the Constitutional 
Treaty would introduce a general power for the European Council 
to adopt a decision allowing the Council to move from unanimity 
where it would still be required in a specific area (e.g. under art.II-
171 in relation to tax harmonisation) to qualified majority voting in 
that area, without amending the Treaty. The procedure would 
however effectively give national Parliaments a veto over such 
changes.
Indirect Representation of Member States
• Commission
1While, under art.213 of the EC Treaty, the members of the 
Commission must neither seek nor take instructions from any 
government or from any other body, only nationals of Member 
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States may be members of the Commission, and under the text in 
force until the just after the 2004 Accessions, the Commission had 
to include at least one national of each of the Member States, but 
could not include more than two members having the nationality of 
the same State. Following the 1995 Accessions, there were 20 
Commissioners, two from each of the big countries (which for this 
purpose included Spain) and one from each of the other Member 
States, though the second paragraph of art.213 provided that the 
number of members of the Commission could  be altered by the 
Council, acting unanimously. One of the matters long discussed in 
political circles was whether the number of Commissioners should 
be reduced to one per State, and there had been ideas floated of 
grouping some of the smaller countries together to have a rotating 
Commissioner between them, which essentially is the system used 
for selecting Advocates-General before the Court (other than those 
who come from the four biggest countries). This debate puts clearly 
into focus the question whether the Commission should be 
regarded as a representative body or simply in terms of its 
operational needs.
The Treaty of Amsterdam did not directly respond to any of these 
proposals, but its Protocol on the institutions with the prospect of 
enlargement of the European Union linked the size of the 
Commission to the weighting of votes in the Council. Under this 
Protocol, at the date of entry into force of the first enlargement of 
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the Union the Commission was to comprise one national of each of 
the Member States, provided that, by that date, the weighting of 
the votes in the Council had been modified, in a manner acceptable 
to all Member States, notably compensating those Member States 
which gave up the possibility of nominating a second member of 
the Commission. 1Here, therefore, the Commission was clearly 
treated as part of the representative equation and not as a body 
whose composition was determined according to its operational 
needs.
This was reflected in the Nice Protocol on Enlargement, and the 
2003 Act of Accession, art.45(2)(c) of which provided that from 
November 2004 (the same date as the change in voting weights in 
the Council) a new Commission comprising one national of each of 
the Member States should take up its duties. 1 However, it was 
further provided in the Protocol that when the Union consists of 27 
Member States, Article 213(1) of the EC Treaty should be revised 
again and that the number of Members of the Commission should 
be less than the number of Member States. The constitutional 
Treaty is more specific on this matter. Under the Constitutional 
Treaty (art.I-26(6)), the first Commission after its entry into force 
would comprise one member from each State (including the EU 
Minister for Foreign Affairs), continuing the current situation, and 
subsequent Commissions would then have members (including its 
President and the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs) 
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corresponding to two-thirds of the number of Member States, 
“unless the European Council, acting unanimously, decides to alter 
this figure”. They would be selected on a basis of “equal rotation” 
between Member States under a system to be established 
unanimously by the European Council on the basis of the following 
principles:
(a)Member States are to be treated on a strictly equal footing 
as regards determination of the sequence of, and the time 
spent by, their nationals as Members of the Commission, 
so that the difference between the total number of terms 
of office held by nationals of any given pair of Member 
States may never be more than one;
(b) subject to point (a), each successive Commission shall be 
so composed as to reflect satisfactorily the demographic 
and geographical range of all the Member States of the 
Union.
This may be contrasted with the solution adopted already in the 
context of the European Central Bank. Its Executive Board has and 
would continue under the Constitutional Treaty to have only six 
Members, who would be appointed by the European Council by 
qualified majority. All the governors of participating national 
central banks sit on its Governing Council, but under Council 
Decision 2003/223 (OJ 2003 L83/66), whose effect is continued by 
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the Protocol on the Statute of the Bank annexed to the 
Constitutional Treaty, complex voting procedures are triggered 
when the number of governors exceeds 15 and when it exceeds 22. 
The governors are to be divided into groups according to defined 
financial criteria, and voting rights (totalling only 15, but weighted 
towards the group with the highest financial ranking) are to be 
allocated to those groups, with those within each group having 
their votes for equal amounts of time. As reproduced in the 
Protocol attached to the Constitutional Treaty:
“1. In accordance with Article III-382(1) of the Constitution, 
the Governing Council shall comprise the members of the 
Executive Board of the European Central Bank and the 
Governors of the national central banks of the Member States 
without a derogation as referred to in Article III-197 of the 
Constitution.
2. Each member of the Governing Council shall have one 
vote. As from the date on which the number of members of 
the Governing Council exceeds 21, each member of the 
Executive Board shall have one vote and the number of 
governors with a voting right shall be 15. The latter voting 
rights shall be assigned and shall rotate as follows:
(a)as from the date on which the number of governors 
exceeds 15 and until it reaches 22, the governors 
shall be allocated to two groups, according to a 
ranking of the size of the share of their national 
central bank's Member State in the aggregate gross 
domestic product at market prices and in the total 
aggregated balance sheet of the monetary financial 
institutions of the Member States whose currency is 
the euro. The shares in the aggregate gross 
domestic product at market prices and in the total 
aggregated balance sheet of the monetary financial 
institutions shall be assigned weights of 5/6 and 1/6, 
respectively. The first group shall be composed of 
five governors and the second group of the 
remaining governors. The frequency of voting rights 
of the governors allocated to the first group shall not 
be lower than the frequency of voting rights of those 
19
of the second group. Subject to the previous 
sentence, the first group shall be assigned four 
voting rights and the second group eleven voting 
rights;
(b)as from the date on which the number of governors 
reaches 22, the governors shall be allocated to three 
groups according to a ranking based on the criteria 
laid down in (a). The first group shall be composed 
of five governors and shall be assigned four voting 
rights. The second group shall be composed of half 
of the total number of governors, with any fraction 
rounded up to the nearest integer, and shall be 
assigned eight voting rights. The third group shall 
be composed of the remaining governors and shall 
be assigned three voting rights;
(c) within each group, the governors shall have their 
voting rights for equal amounts of time;…………..
(f) the Governing Council, acting by a two-thirds 
majority of all its members, with and without a 
voting right, shall take all measures necessary for 
the implementation of the principles laid down in 
this subparagraph and may decide to postpone the 
start of the rotation system until the date on which 
the number of governors exceeds 18.”
While this preserves the representative nature of the Governing 
Council, but at the price of limiting voting rights, it may be 
suggested that the Executive Board, with its limited but fully 
participatory membership, offers a better analogy for the future 
development of the Commission.
Direct and Indirect Representation of Citizens
• European Parliament
1Since 1979, the European Parliament has been elected directly by 
the citizens of the Community, albeit not by uniform methods. The 
seats are nevertheless allocated to each Member State in a way 
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which is not directly proportionate to population but which gives 
the bigger Member States more seats than the smaller ones. Until 
German reunification, the range went from 6 seats for Luxembourg 
to 81 each for Germany, France, the UK and Italy. However, 
following the reunification of Germany, it was agreed to recognise 
the demographic consequences at least to some extent: the number 
of seats for Germany was raised to 99 (an increase of 18 seats), but 
the seats for the other three big states were raised by six each to 
87, making a total of 18 additional seats between those States. The 
consequence overall therefore was to increase the relative 
representation of the big Member States as compared to the 
smaller ones, but also to ensure that the increase for Germany was 
balanced by an increase for the other big States, thus showing that 
the balancing of political weight was as important as (if not more 
important than) the representation of additional population. Be that 
as it may, this did suggest that a possible way forward with regard 
to new small states would be not to eliminate their representation 
but to increase the representation of the bigger Member States.
The Treaty of Amsterdam did not in itself change the composition 
of the European Parliament, but it set a limit on its future 
expansion, by amending art.189 of the EC Treaty to provide that 
"the number of Members of the European Parliament shall not 
exceed seven hundred." This limit has however proved to be very 
short-lived. The Treaty of Nice amended art.189 again to raise the 
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limit to 732, which could be exceeded on a transitional basis 
following new accessions under art.2 of the Protocol on 
Enlargement, and the Constitutional Treaty would raise it again to 
750. 
By virtue of art.11 of the 2003 Act of Accession, the provisions 
relating to the European Parliament take effect from the start of 
the 2004–2009 term, so that the Parliament elected in the summer 
of 2004 took part in the appointment of the first Commission 
governed by the new rules, which took office on 22 November 
2004, later than the planned date of 1 November 2004 owing to the 
Parliament’s success in obtaining changes to the list of nominees 
put forward by the Council. It is provided in art.11 of the 2003 Act 
of Accession that the number of representatives elected in each 



























   
The practical result is that there has been a reduction of 
representation for most pre-2004 Member States except Germany 
and Luxembourg. Currently Malta has only 5 MEPs  under art.11 of 
the Act of Accession 2003, the smallest number of any Member 
State – less even than Luxembourg. However, under the 
Constitutional Treaty, it is stated as a general principle that 
representation is to be “degressively proportional” with a minimum 
of six members per Member State (art.I-20(2)) and no more than 96 
from one Member State (total up to 750). This would increase the 
number of MEPs from Malta, and illustrates clearly that while big 
States have more MEPs than small ones, small ones are 
proportionately better represented, so as to allow for an effective 
political choice in even the smallest Member State.
It may also be observed in the context of the Parliament that a 
revised form of codecision would become the “ordinary legislative 
procedure” under art.I-34(1) and art.III-396. The essential feature 
of codecision is that it requires the Council and the Parliament to 
reach agreement in order to adopt the measures at issue, and that 




In many respects the Constitutional Treaty provides greater 
opportunities for national parliaments to play an active role in the 
EU context. They are given a formalized role in the context of 
subsidiarity under art.I-11(3), which empowers national 
parliaments  to ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity 
in accordance with the procedure set out in the revised text of the 
Protocol  on Subsidiarity and Proportionality. The Constitutional 
Treaty amends this Protocol, which was originally introduced by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, so as to require the Commission to 
forward its draft European legislative acts and its amended drafts 
to national Parliaments at the same time as to the Union legislator. 
It also requires the European Parliament to forward its draft 
European legislative acts and its amended drafts to national 
Parliaments, and it states that the Council must forward draft 
European legislative acts originating from a group of Member 
States, the Court of Justice, the European Central Bank or the 
European Investment Bank (and amended drafts) to national 
Parliaments. Furthermore, upon adoption, legislative resolutions of 
the European Parliament and positions of the Council must be 
forwarded by them to national Parliaments.  It will however be for 
each national Parliament or each chamber of a national Parliament 
to consult, where appropriate, regional parliaments with legislative 
powers.
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Under art.6 of the Protocol, any national Parliament or any 
chamber of a national Parliament may, within six weeks from the 
date of transmission of a draft European legislative act, send to the 
Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the 
draft in question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. 
It would be for the President of the Council, if the draft European 
legislative act originates from a group of Member States, or 
another EU institution or body, to forward the opinion to the 
governments of those Member States or to the EU institution or 
body concerned. The European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission, and, where appropriate, the group of
Member States, or other EU institutions and bodies if the draft 
legislative act originates from them, are then required “take 
account” of the reasoned opinions issued by national Parliaments or 
by a chamber of a national Parliament. 
It is further provided in art.7 that where reasoned opinions on a 
draft European legislative act's non-compliance with the principle 
of subsidiarity represent at least one third of all the votes allocated 
to the national Parliaments, “the draft must be reviewed”.  In 
calculating such a vote, each national Parliament would have two 
votes, shared out on the basis of the national Parliamentary system. 
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In the case of a bicameral Parliamentary system, each of the two 
chambers would have one vote.
This threshold would be a reduced to a quarter of the allocated 
votes in the case of a draft European legislative act submitted on 
the basis of art. III–264 of the
Constitutional Treaty on the area of freedom, security and justice. 
After carrying out such a review, the Commission or, where 
appropriate, the group of Member States, the European 
Parliament, the Court of Justice, the European Central Bank or the 
European Investment Bank, if the draft European legislative act 
originates from them, may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw 
the draft, but reasons must be given for this decision.
National Parliaments are also given a right of action before the 
European Court.  Art.8 declares that the Court of Justice of the 
European Union shall have jurisdiction in actions on grounds of 
infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a European 
legislative act, brought in accordance with the rules laid down in 
art.III-365 of the Constitutional Treaty (which governs actions for 
annulment) by Member States, or notified by them in accordance 
with their legal order on behalf of their national Parliament or a 
chamber of it. Similarly, the Committee of the Regions would also 
be empowered to bring such actions against European legislative 
acts for the adoption of which the Constitution provides that it be 
consulted.
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The national parliaments are also expressly involved in the 
“flexibility clause” (art.I-18), which makes a procedure similar to 
the current art.308 of the EC Treaty available for the EU as a 
whole. It provides that if action by the Union should prove 
necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in Part III, 
to attain one of the objectives set by the Constitution, and the 
Constitution has not provided the necessary powers, the Council of 
Ministers, acting unanimously on a proposal from the European 
Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament, may adopt the appropriate measures. However, art.I-
18(2) then adds that using the procedure for monitoring the 
subsidiarity principle referred to in art.I-11(3), the Commission 
must draw Member States' national Parliaments' attention to 
proposals based on this provision.
A stronger role is given to national parliaments in the context of 
what is termed  “the simplified revision procedure” under art.IV-
444 of the Constitutional Treaty. As noted earlier in this paper, this 
would introduce a general power for the European Council to adopt 
a decision allowing the Council to move from acting by unanimity 
where it would still be required in a specific area (e.g. under art.II-
171 in relation to tax harmonisation) to qualified majority voting in 
that area, without amending the Treaty. However, under art.IV-
444(3), any initiative taken by the European Council on the this 
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basis must be notified to the national Parliaments of the Member 
States, and if a national Parliament made known its opposition 
within six months of the date of such notification, the European 
decision could not be adopted. It would only be in the absence of 
opposition that the European Council could adopt the decision. It 
may be observed that in this context no distinction is made 
between the parliament of e.g. Germany and the parliament of e.g. 
Malta or Luxembourg.
Similarly, the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments, 
originally annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, has been 
considerably reinforced. In the version adopted with the 
Constitutional Treaty, not only must Commission consultation 
documents (green and white papers and communications) be 
forwarded directly by the Commission to national Parliaments upon 
publication, but the Commission must also forward the annual 
legislative programme as well as any other instrument of legislative 
planning or policy to national Parliaments, at the same time as to 
the European Parliament and the Council. It would also be required 
that draft European legislative acts sent to the European 
Parliament and to the Council must be forwarded to national 
Parliaments; ‘draft European legislative acts’ are defined as 
proposals from the Commission, initiatives from a group of Member 
States, initiatives from the European Parliament, requests from the 
Court of Justice, recommendations from the European Central Bank 
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and requests from the European Investment Bank for the adoption 
of a European legislative act. More specifically, it is required that 
draft European legislative acts originating from the Commission 
must be forwarded to national Parliaments directly by the 
Commission, at the same time as to the European Parliament and 
the Council.
Draft European legislative acts originating from the European 
Parliament are to be forwarded to national Parliaments directly by 
the European Parliament, and draft European legislative acts 
originating from a group of Member States, the Court of Justice, 
the European Central Bank or the European Investment Bank are 
to be forwarded to national Parliaments by the Council.
Art.3 of the Protocol then provides that National Parliaments may 
send to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission a reasoned opinion on whether a draft European 
legislative act complies with the principle of subsidiarity, in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in the Protocol on the
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
mentioned above. If the draft European legislative act originated 
from a group of Member States, the President of the Council would 
have to forward the reasoned opinion or opinions to the 
governments of those Member States, and if it originated from the 
Court of Justice, the European Central Bank or the European 
Investment Bank, the President of the Council would have to 
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forward the reasoned opinion or opinions to the institution or body 
concerned.
Effectively following the original text, art.4 would require that a 
six week period should elapse between a draft European legislative 
act being made available to national Parliaments in the official 
languages of the Union and the date when it is placed on a 
provisional agenda for the Council for its adoption or for adoption 
of a position under a legislative procedure. Exceptions would 
however be possible in cases of urgency, the reasons for which 
would have to be stated in the act or position of the Council. The 
Protocol would expressly lay down that save in urgent cases for 
which due reasons have been given, no agreement may be reached 
on a draft European legislative act during those six weeks. 
Furthermore, save in urgent cases for which due reasons have 
been given, a ten day period would have to elapse between the 
placing of a draft European legislative act on the provisional 
agenda for the Council and the adoption of a position. Under art.5, 
the agendas for and the outcome of meetings of the Council, 
including the minutes of meetings where the Council was 
deliberating on draft European legislative acts, would have to be 
forwarded directly to national Parliaments, at the same time as to 
Member States' governments. There is however a direct link to the 
simplified revision procedure in art.6 of the Protocol, which 
provides that when the European Council intends to make use of 
Article IV-444(1) or (2) of the Constitution, national Parliaments 
must be informed of the initiative of the European Council at least 
six months before any European decision is adopted.
Finally, arts.9 and 10 of the Protocol take inter-Parliamentary 
cooperation beyond the previous version. It is provided that the 
European Parliament and national Parliaments shall together 
determine the organisation and promotion of effective and regular 
interparliamentary cooperation within the Union. Furthermore, 
what is renamed a “Conference of Parliamentary Committees for 
Union Affairs” may submit any contribution it deems appropriate 
for the attention of the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission. That conference may in addition promote the 
exchange of information and best practice between national 
Parliaments and the European Parliament, including their special 
committees. It may also organize interparliamentary conferences 
on specific topics, in particular to debate matters of common 
foreign and security policy, including common security and defence 
policy. However, contributions from the conference would not bind 
national Parliaments and would not prejudge their positions.
Conclusion
While many of these changes might appear to involve matters of 
technical detail, it may be suggested that far from introducing a 
federal superstate, the institutional changes which would result 
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from the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty tend to 
realign the balance in favour of national parliaments and small 
states, while beginning to take account of operational requirements 
in the context of non-representative bodies such as the 
Commission.
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